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hacspec: succinct, executable, verifiable specifications for high-assurance cryptography embedded in Rust

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Abstract—Despite significant progress in the formal verification of security-critical components like cryptographic libraries and protocols, the secure integration of these components into larger unverified applications remains an open challenge. The first problem is that any memory safety bug or side-channel leak in the unverified code can nullify the security guarantees of the verified code. A second issue is that application developers may misunderstand the specification and assumptions of the verified code and so use it incorrectly.

In this paper, we propose a novel verification framework that seeks to close these gaps for applications written in Rust. At the heart of this framework is **hacspec**, a new language for writing succinct, executable, formal specifications for cryptographic components. Syntactically, **hacspec** is a purely functional subset of Rust that aims to be readable by developers, cryptographers, and verification experts. An application developer can use **hacspec** to specify and prototype cryptographic components in Rust, and then replace this specification with a verified implementation before deployment. We present the **hacspec** language, its formal semantics and type system, and describe a translation from **hacspec** to F^* . We evaluate the language and its toolchain on a library of popular cryptographic algorithms.

An earlier attempt in this direction by some of the same authors, was also called **hacspec**, and sought to embed a cryptographic specification language into Python [13]. We now believe that the strong typing of Rust provides an essential improvement to the specification and programming workflow. This work subsumes and obsoletes that earlier attempt. Hereafter, we use **hacspec-python** to refer to this prior version.

1. Introduction

Modern Web applications use sophisticated cryptographic constructions and protocols to protect sensitive user data that may be sent over the wire or stored at rest. However, the additional design complexity and performance cost of cryptography is only justified if it is implemented and used correctly. To prevent common software bugs like buffer overflows [40] without compromising on performance, developers of security-oriented applications, like the Zcash and Libra blockchains, are increasingly turning to strongly typed languages like Rust. However, these type systems cannot prevent deeper security flaws. Any side-channel leak [1] or mathematical bug [20] in the cryptographic library, any parsing bug [27] or state machine flaw [11] in the protocol code, or any




Figure 1. **hacspec programming and verification workflow**. The Rust programmer writes executable specifications for cryptographic components in **hacspec** and compiles them to formal specifications (in F^*). The proof engineer implements the cryptographic components (in Low^* or Jasmin) and proves that they meet their specifications. The verified code is compiled to high-performance C or assembly code, which is finally wrapped within Rust modules (using foreign function interfaces) that can safely replace the original **hacspec** specifications.

misused cryptographic API [18] may allow an attacker to steal sensitive user data, bypassing all the cryptographic protections.

The problem is that these kinds of deep bugs often appear only in rarely-used corner-cases that are hard to find by random testing, but can be easily exploited by attackers who know of their existence. Furthermore, since cryptographic computations often constitute a performance bottleneck in high-speed network implementations, the code for these security-critical components is typically

written in low-level C and assembly and makes use of subtle mathematical optimizations, making it hard to audit and test for developers who are not domain experts.

Formal Verification of Cryptographic Components. In recent years, formal methods for software verification have emerged as effective tools for systematically preventing entire classes of bugs in cryptographic software (see [7] for a survey). For example, verification frameworks like F* [45], EasyCrypt [9], and Coq [10] are used to verify high-performance cryptographic code written in C [48], [29] and assembly [19], [2]. Cryptographic analysis tools like ProVerif [16] and CryptoVerif [17] are used to verify protocols for security properties against sophisticated attackers [14], [12]. Languages like F* have been used to write verified parsers [44] and protocol code [24], [41].

By focusing on specific security-critical components, these tools have been able to make practical contributions towards increasing the assurance of widely-used cryptographic software. For example, verified C code from the HACL* cryptographic library [48] is currently deployed within the Firefox web browser and Linux kernel.

Conversely, the use of domain-specific tools also has its drawbacks. Each verification tool has its own formal specification language tailored for a particular class of analysis techniques. This fragmentation means that we cannot easily compose a component verified against an F* specification with another verified using EasyCrypt. More worryingly, these formal languages are unfamiliar to developers, which can lead to misunderstandings of the verified guarantees and the unintended misuse of the components. For example, an application developer who incorrectly assumes that an elliptic curve implementation validates the peer’s public key may decide to skip this check and become vulnerable to an attack [22].

Safely Integrating Verified Code. Without sufficient care, the interface between unverified application code and verified components can become a point of vulnerability. Applications may misuse verified components or compose them incorrectly. Even worse, a memory safety bug or a side-channel leak in unverified application code may reveal cryptographic secrets to the adversary, even if all the cryptographic code is formally verified. A classic example is HeartBleed [27], a memory safety bug in the OpenSSL implementation of an obscure protocol feature, which allowed remote attackers to learn the private keys for thousands of web servers. A similar bug anywhere in the millions of lines of C++ code in the Firefox web browser would invalidate all the verification guarantees of the embedded HACL* crypto code.

To address these concerns, we propose a hybrid framework (depicted in Fig. 1) that allows programmers to safely integrate application code written in a strongly typed programming language with clearly specified security-critical components that are verified using domain-specific tools. We choose Rust as the application programming, and rely on the Rust type system to guarantee memory safety. In addition, we provide a library of secret integers that enforces a *secret independent* coding discipline to eliminate source-level timing side-channels. Hence, well-typed code that only uses secret integers does not break the security guarantees of embedded crypto components.

hacspect: Cryptographic Specifications In Rust. At the heart of our framework is hacspect, a specification language for cryptographic components with several notable features: (1) Syntactically, hacspect is a subset of Rust, and hence is familiar to developers, who can use the standard Rust development toolchain to read and write specifications of cryptographic algorithms and constructions. (2) Specs written in hacspect are executable and so they can be tested for correctness and interoperability, and they can be used as prototype implementations of crypto when testing the rest of the application. (3) The hacspect library includes high-level abstractions for commonly used mathematical constructs like prime fields, modular arithmetic, and arrays, allowing the developer to write succinct specifications that correspond closely with the pseudocode descriptions of cryptographic algorithms in published standards. (4) hacspect is a purely functional language without side-effects, equipped with a clean formal semantics that makes specifications easy to reason about and easy to translate to other formal languages like F*.

These features set hacspect apart from other crypto-oriented specification languages. The closest prior work that inspired the design of hacspect is hacspect-python [13], a cryptographic specification language embedded in Python that could also be compiled to languages like F*. However, unlike Rust, Python is typically not used to build cryptographic software, so specs written in hacspect-python stand apart from the normal developer workflow and serve more as documentation than as useful software components. Furthermore, since Python is untyped, hacspect-python relies on a custom type-checker, but building and maintaining a Python type-checker that provides intuitive error messages is a challenging engineering task. Because of these usability challenges, hacspect-python has fallen into disuse, but we believe that our approach of integrating hacspect specifications into the normal Rust development workflow offers greater concrete benefits to application developers, which increases its chances of adoption.

Contributions. We propose a new framework for safely integrating verified cryptographic components into Rust applications. As depicted in Figure 1, the developer starts with a hacspect specification of a crypto component that serves as a prototype implementation for testing. Then, via a series of compilation and verification steps, we obtain a Rust module that meets the hacspect specification and can be used to replace the hacspect module before the application is deployed. Hence, the programmer can incrementally swap in verified components while retaining full control over the specifications of each component.

Our main contribution is hacspect, a new specification language for security-critical components that seeks to be accessible to Rust programmers, cryptographers, and verification experts. We present the formal syntax and semantics of hacspect, which is the first formalization of a purely functional subset of Rust, to our knowledge. We demonstrate the use of hacspect on a series of popular cryptographic algorithms, but we believe that hacspect can be used more generally to write functional specifications for Rust code. Our second contribution is a set of tools for hacspect, including a compiler from hacspect to F* that enable the safe integration of verified C and assembly code HACL* in Rust applications. Our third contribution is a set

of libraries that any Rust application may use independent of *hacspect*, including a secret integer library that enforces a constant-time coding discipline, and Rust bindings for the full EverCrypt cryptographic provider [42].

The main technical limitation of our work is that not all the steps are formally verified. To use verified C code from HACLS* for example, the programmer needs to trust the compiler from *hacspect* to F*, the Rust binding code that calls the C code from Rust, and the Rust and C compilers. We carefully document each of these steps and intend to formalize and verify some of these elements in the future. In this work, however, we focus on building a pragmatic toolchain that solves a pressing software engineering problem in real-world cryptographic software.

Outline. Section §2 starts by presenting the *hacspect* language and its implementation. Then, we introduce our security-oriented Rust libraries in section §3, that can be used in conjunction with the *hacspect* language or in a standalone context. Section §4 deals with the connection between the Rust-based *hacspect* tooling and multiple verification frameworks having a track record in cryptographic proofs. Finally, we discuss related and future work in section §5. Appendix §A contains the full presentation of *hacspect*’s typing judgment.

2. The *hacspect* Language

hacspect is a domain-specific language embedded in the Rust programming language and targeted towards cryptographic specifications. It serves several purposes. Firstly, it acts as a frontend for verification toolchains. We provide a formal description of the syntax, semantics and type system of *hacspect* as a reference, and describe translations from *hacspect* to specifications in F*. Secondly, *hacspect* aims to be a shared language that can foster communication between cryptographers, Rust programmers and proof engineers.

As a motivating example, consider the ChaCha20 encryption algorithm standardized in RFC 8439 [39]. The RFC includes pseudocode for the ChaCha20 block function in 20 lines of informal syntax (see Fig. 3). However, this pseudocode is not executable and hence cannot be tested for bugs. Indeed, an earlier version of this RFC has several errors in pseudocode. Furthermore, pseudocode lacks a formal semantics and cannot be used as a formal specification for software verification tools.

Fig. 2 shows code for the same function written in *hacspect*. It has 23 lines of code, and matches the RFC pseudocode almost line-by-line. The code is concise and high-level, but at the same time is well-typed Rust code that can be executed and debugged with standard programming tools. Finally, this code has a well-defined formal semantics and can be seen as a target for formal verification.

We believe that *hacspect* programs straddle the fine line between pseudocode, formal specification, and prototype implementation and are useful both as documentation and as software artifacts. In this section, we detail the syntax, semantics and type system of *hacspect*, show how we embed it in Rust, and describe our main design decisions.

```

1 fn inner_block (state: State) -> State {
2   let state = quarter_round (0, 4, 8, 12, state);
3   let state = quarter_round (1, 5, 9, 13, state);
4   let state = quarter_round (2, 6, 10, 14, state);
5   let state = quarter_round (3, 7, 11, 15, state);
6   let state = quarter_round (0, 5, 10, 15, state);
7   let state = quarter_round (1, 6, 11, 12, state);
8   let state = quarter_round (2, 7, 8, 13, state);
9   quarter_round (3, 4, 9, 14, state)
10 }
11
12 fn block (key: Key, ctr: U32, iv: IV) -> StateBytes {
13   let mut state = State::from_seq (&constants_init ())
14     .concat (&key_to_u32s (key))
15     .concat (&ctr_to_seq (ctr))
16     .concat (&iv_to_u32s (iv));
17   let mut working_state = state;
18   for i in 0..10 {
19     working_state = chacha_double_round (state);
20   }
21   state = state + working_state;
22   state_to_bytes (state)
23 }

```

Figure 2. *hacspect*’s version of Chacha20 Block

```

1 inner_block (state) :
2   Qround (state, 0, 4, 8, 12)
3   Qround (state, 1, 5, 9, 13)
4   Qround (state, 2, 6, 10, 14)
5   Qround (state, 3, 7, 11, 15)
6   Qround (state, 0, 5, 10, 15)
7   Qround (state, 1, 6, 11, 12)
8   Qround (state, 2, 7, 8, 13)
9   Qround (state, 3, 4, 9, 14)
10  end
11
12 chacha20_block (key, counter, nonce) :
13   state = constants | key | counter | nonce
14   working_state = state
15   for i=1 upto 10
16     inner_block (working_state)
17   end
18   state += working_state
19   return serialize (state)
20  end

```

Figure 3. The ChaCha20 Block Function in Pseudocode (RFC7532, 2.3.1)

2.1. An Embedded Domain Specific Language

hacspect is a typed subset of Rust, and hence all *hacspect* programs are valid Rust programs. However, the expressiveness of *hacspect* is deliberately limited, compared to the full Rust language. We believe that a side-effect-free purely-functional style is best suited for concise and understandable specifications. Extensive use of mutable state, as in C and Rust programs, obscures the flow of data and forces programmers to think about memory allocation and state invariants, which detracts from the goal of writing “obviously correct” specifications. Hence, we restrict *hacspect* to forbid mutable borrows, and we limit immutable borrows to function arguments.

The usual way of writing side-effect-free code in Rust is to use `.clone()` to duplicate values. Figuring out where to insert `.clone()` calls is notably difficult for new Rust users – in spite of good quality Rust compiler error messages. We intentionally strived to reduce the need for `.clone()` calls in *hacspect*. We leverage the `Copy` trait for all the values

that can be represented by an array of machine integers whose length is known at compile-time. This holds true for all kinds of machine integers, but also for the value types defined in the libraries (later discussed in §3).

hacspect benefits from the strong type system of Rust both to avoid specification bugs and to cleanly separate logically different values using types. For instance, separately declared array types like `Key` and `StateBytes` are disjoint, which forces the user to explicitly cast between them and avoids, for instance, the inadvertent mixing of cryptographic keys with internal state.

2.2. Syntax, Semantics, Type System

We describe in detail a simplified version of **hacspect**. The main simplification lies in the values of the language. We present our formalization with a dummy integer type, but the full **hacspect** language features all kinds of machine integers, as well as modular natural integers. The manipulation of these other values, detailed in §3, does not involve new syntax or unusual semantics rules, so we omit them from our presentation. Essentially, the rules for binary and unary operators over each kind of machine and natural integers are similar to the rules for our dummy integers; all other operators are modeled as functions and therefore governed by the standard rules about functions.

Syntax. The syntax of **hacspect** (Fig. 4) is a strict subset of Rust’s surface syntax, with all the standard control flow operators, values, and functions. However, **hacspect** source files are also expected to import a standard library that defines several macros like `array!`. These macros add abstractions like arrays and natural integers to **hacspect**. The other notable syntactic feature of **hacspect** is the restriction on borrowing: **hacspect** only allows immutable borrowings in function arguments. This is the key mechanism by which we are able to greatly simplify the general semantics of safe Rust, compared to existing work like Oxide [47].

Semantics. The structured operational semantics for **hacspect** corresponds to a simple first-order, imperative, call-by-value programming language. To demonstrate the simplicity of these semantics, we will present them in full here.

The first list of Fig. 5 presents the values of the language: booleans, integers, arrays and tuples. The evaluation context is an unordered map from variable identifiers to values. Here are the different evaluation judgments that we will present:

The second list of Fig. 5 shows the evaluation judgments for the various syntactic kinds of **hacspect**. The big-step evaluation judgment for expressions $p; \Omega \vdash e \Downarrow v$, reads as: “in program p (containing the function bodies to evaluate function calls) and evaluation context Ω , the expression e evaluates to value v ”. The other evaluation judgments read in a similar way. The last evaluation judgment is the top-level function evaluation, which is meant as the entry point of the evaluation of a **hacspect** program.

First, let us examine the simplest rules for values and variable evaluation:

p	$::=$	$[i]^*$	program items
i	$::=$	$\text{array!} (t, \mu, n \in \mathbb{N})$	array type declaration
	$ $	$\text{fn } f ([d]^+) \rightarrow \mu b$	function declaration
d	$::=$	$x : \tau$	function argument
μ	$::=$	$\text{unit} \mid \text{bool} \mid \text{int}$	base types
	$ $	$\text{Seq} < \mu >$	sequence
	$ $	t	type variable
	$ $	$([\mu]^+)$	tuple
τ	$::=$	μ	plain type
	$ $	$\&\mu$	immutable reference
b	$::=$	$\{ [s;]^+ \}$	block
s	$::=$	$\text{let } x : \tau = e$	let binding
	$ $	$x = e$	variable reassignment
	$ $	$\text{if } e \text{ then } b (\text{else } b)$	conditional statements
	$ $	$\text{for } x \text{ in } e \dots e b$	for loop (integers only)
	$ $	$x [e] = e$	array update
	$ $	e	return expression
	$ $	b	statement block
e	$::=$	$() \mid \text{true} \mid \text{false}$	unit and boolean literals
	$ $	$n \in \mathbb{N}$	integer literal
	$ $	x	variable
	$ $	$f ([a]^+)$	function call
	$ $	$e \odot e$	binary operations
	$ $	$\odot e$	unary operations
	$ $	$([e]^+)$	tuple constructor
	$ $	$e . (n \in \mathbb{N})$	tuple field access
	$ $	$x [e]$	array or seq index
a	$::=$	e	linear argument
	$ $	$\&e$	call-site borrowing
\odot	$::=$	$+ \mid - \mid *$	
	$ $	$/ \mid \&\& \mid \mid \mid$	
	$ $	$= \mid ! = \mid > \mid <$	
\odot	$::=$	$- \mid \sim$	

Figure 4. Syntax of **hacspect**

Value	v	$::=$	$() \mid \text{true} \mid \text{false}$
		$ $	$n \in \mathbb{Z}$
		$ $	$[[v]^*]$
		$ $	$([v]^*)$
Evaluation context (unordered map)	Ω	$::=$	\emptyset
		$ $	$x \mapsto v, \Omega$
Expression evaluation			$p; \Omega \vdash e \Downarrow v$
Function argument evaluation			$p; \Omega \vdash a \Downarrow v$
Statement evaluation			$p; \Omega \vdash s \Downarrow v \Rightarrow \Omega$
Block evaluation			$p; \Omega \vdash b \Downarrow v \Rightarrow \Omega$
Function evaluation			$p \vdash f (v_1, \dots, v_n) \Downarrow v$

Figure 5. Values and evaluation judgments of **hacspect**

EVALUNIT	EVALBOOL	EVALINT
$\frac{}{p; \Omega \vdash () \Downarrow ()}$	$\frac{b \in \{\text{true}, \text{false}\}}{p; \Omega \vdash b \Downarrow b}$	$\frac{n \in \mathbb{Z}}{p; \Omega \vdash n \Downarrow n}$
	EVALVAR	
	$\frac{x \mapsto v \in \Omega}{p; \Omega \vdash x \Downarrow v}$	

We can now move to the rules for function calls evaluation. As shown in the syntax, some immutable borrowing is authorized for function calls arguments. This borrowing is basically transparent for our evaluation semantics, as the following rules show:

EVALFUNCARG	EVALBORROWEDFUNCARG
$\frac{p; \Omega \vdash e \Downarrow v}{p; \Omega \vdash e \Downarrow v}$	$\frac{p; \Omega \vdash e \Downarrow v}{p; \Omega \vdash \&e \Downarrow v}$

All values inside the evaluation context Ω are assumed to be duplicable at will. Of course, an interpreter following these rules will be considerably slower compared to the original Rust memory sharing discipline, because it will have to copy a lot of values around. But we argue that this simpler evaluation semantics yields the same results as the original Rust, for our very restricted subset.

We can now proceed to the function call evaluation rule, which looks up the program p for the body of the function called.

$$\text{EVALFUNCCALL} \quad \frac{\text{fn } f (x_1 : \tau_1, \dots, x_n : \tau_n) \rightarrow \mu b \in p \quad \forall i \in [1, n], p; \Omega \vdash a_i \Downarrow v_i \quad p; x_1 \mapsto v_1, \dots, x_n \mapsto v_n \vdash b \Downarrow v}{p; \Omega \vdash f (a_1, \dots, a_n) \Downarrow v}$$

Next, the evaluation rules for binary and unary operators. These rules are completely standard and assume that the operator has been formally defined on the values of `hacspect` it can operate on. The dummy arithmetic operators that we have defined in our syntax are assumed to operate only on integers and have the usual integer arithmetic behavior.

$$\begin{array}{c} \text{EVALBINARYOP} \\ \frac{p; \Omega \vdash e_1 \Downarrow v_1 \quad p; \Omega \vdash e_2 \Downarrow v_2}{p; \Omega \vdash e_1 \odot e_2 \Downarrow v_1 \odot v_2} \end{array} \quad \begin{array}{c} \text{EVALUNARYOP} \\ \frac{p; \Omega \vdash e \Downarrow v}{p; \Omega \vdash \odot e \Downarrow \odot v} \end{array}$$

The rules governing tuples are also very standard. Here, we chose to include only tuple access $e.n$ in our semantics but one can derive similar rules for a tuple destructuring of the form `let (x1, ..., xn) : τ = e` (which can also be viewed as a syntactic sugar for multiple tuple accesses).

$$\begin{array}{c} \text{EVALTUPLE} \\ \frac{\forall i \in [1, n], p; \Omega \vdash e_i \Downarrow v_i}{p; \Omega \vdash (e_1, \dots, e_n) \Downarrow (v_1, \dots, v_n)} \end{array} \quad \begin{array}{c} \text{EVALTUPLEACCESS} \\ \frac{p; \Omega \vdash e \Downarrow (v_1, \dots, v_m) \quad n \in [1, m]}{p; \Omega \vdash e.n \Downarrow v_n} \end{array}$$

Array accesses are handled similarly to tuple accesses. Note that while the Rust syntax for array access is only a syntactic sugar that calls the `.index()` function of the `Index` trait, we view it as a primitive of the language. By giving a dedicated evaluation rule to this construct, we are able to hide the immutable borrowing performed by the `.index()` function.

$$\text{EVALARRAYACCESS} \quad \frac{p; \Omega \vdash x \Downarrow [v_0, \dots, v_m] \quad p; \Omega \vdash e \Downarrow n \quad n \in [0, m]}{p; \Omega \vdash x[e] \Downarrow v_n}$$

We have completely described the evaluation of expressions, let us now move to statements. The next two rules are similar but correspond to two very different variable assignments. The first rule is a traditional, expression-based let binding that creates a new scope for the variable x . The second rule deals with variable reassignment: x has to be created first with a let-binding before reassigning it. We omit here the difference that Rust does between immutable and mutable variables (`mut`). Rust has an immutable-by-default policy that helps programmers better spot where they incorporate mutable state, but here we just assume that all variables are mutable for the sake of simplicity. Both statements have a unit return type, to match Rust's behavior.

$$\begin{array}{c} \text{EVALLET} \\ \frac{x \notin \Omega \quad p; \Omega \vdash e \Downarrow v}{p; \Omega \vdash \text{let } x : \tau = e \Downarrow () \Rightarrow x \mapsto v, \Omega} \end{array} \quad \begin{array}{c} \text{EVALREASSIGN} \\ \frac{p; x \mapsto v, \Omega \vdash e \Downarrow v'}{p; x \mapsto v, \Omega \vdash x = e \Downarrow () \Rightarrow x \mapsto v', \Omega} \end{array}$$

The rules for conditional statements are standard. We do not currently include inline conditional expressions in our syntax, although they are legal in Rust and compatible with `hacspect`. This restricts the return type of conditional blocks to unit.

$$\begin{array}{c} \text{EVALIFTHENTRUE} \\ \frac{p; \Omega \vdash e_1 \Downarrow \text{true} \quad p; \Omega \vdash b \Downarrow () \Rightarrow \Omega'}{p; \Omega \vdash \text{if } e_1 b \Downarrow () \Rightarrow \Omega'} \end{array} \quad \begin{array}{c} \text{EVALIFTHENFALSE} \\ \frac{p; \Omega \vdash e_1 \Downarrow \text{false}}{p; \Omega \vdash \text{if } e_1 b \Downarrow () \Rightarrow \Omega} \end{array}$$

$$\begin{array}{c} \text{EVALIFTHENELSETRUE} \\ \frac{p; \Omega \vdash e_1 \Downarrow \text{true} \quad p; \Omega \vdash b \Downarrow () \Rightarrow \Omega'}{p; \Omega \vdash \text{if } e_1 b \text{ else } b' \Downarrow () \Rightarrow \Omega'} \end{array} \quad \begin{array}{c} \text{EVALIFTHENELSEFALSE} \\ \frac{p; \Omega \vdash e_1 \Downarrow \text{false} \quad p; \Omega \vdash b' \Downarrow () \Rightarrow \Omega'}{p; \Omega \vdash \text{if } e_1 b \text{ else } b' \Downarrow () \Rightarrow \Omega'} \end{array}$$

Looping is very restricted in `hacspect`, since we only allow for loops ranging over an integer index. This restriction is purposeful, since general while loops can be difficult to reason about in proof assistants. One could also easily add a construct looping over each element of an array, which Rust already supports. However, we chose not to include the idiomatic `.iter().map()` calls to avoid closures.

$$\text{EVALFORLOOP} \quad \frac{p; \Omega \vdash e_1 \Downarrow n \quad p; \Omega \vdash e_2 \Downarrow m \quad \Omega_n = \Omega \quad \forall i \in [n, m-1], p; x \mapsto i, \Omega_i \vdash b \Downarrow () \Rightarrow \Omega_{i+1}}{p; \Omega \vdash \text{for } x \text{ in } e_1 \dots e_2 b \Downarrow () \Rightarrow \Omega_m}$$

The array update statement semantics are standard. Here, we require that e_1 evaluates to an in-bounds index. We chose to omit the error case where the index falls outside the range of the array, to avoid including a classic propagating error in our semantics. In Rust, the default behavior of out-of-bounds indexing is to raise a `panic!()` that cannot be caught. Like array indexing, array updating is treated by Rust as a syntactic sugar to a `.index_mut()` call, which mutably borrows its argument. We treat this syntactic sugar as a first-class syntactic construct in `hacspect` to carefully specify the behavior of the underlying mutable borrow of the array.

$$\text{EVALARRAYUPD} \quad \frac{p; x \mapsto [v_0, \dots, v_n], \Omega \vdash e_1 \Downarrow m \quad m \in [0, n] \quad p; x \mapsto [v_0, \dots, v_n], \Omega \vdash e_2 \Downarrow v}{p; x \mapsto [v_0, \dots, v_n], \Omega \vdash x[e_1] = e_2 \Downarrow () \Rightarrow x \mapsto [v_0, \dots, v_{m-1}, v, v_{m+1}, \dots, v_n], \Omega}$$

The next two rules replicate the special case of the last statement of a block in Rust. Indeed, the `return` keyword in Rust is optional for the last statement of a function, because the value returned by a function is assumed to be the result of the expression contained in the last statement.

In fact, our syntax does not include the `return` keyword at all to avoid control-flow-breaking effects.

$$\frac{\text{EVALEXPRSTMT} \quad p; \Omega \vdash e \Downarrow v}{p; \Omega \vdash e \Downarrow v \Rightarrow \Omega}$$

Blocks in Rust are a list of statements, which also act as a scoping unit: a variable defined inside a block cannot escape it. This behavior is captured by the intersection of the two contexts at the end of `EVALBLOCKASSTATEMENT`: we keep all the values Ω' that were already defined in Ω .

$$\begin{array}{c} \text{EVALBLOCK} \\ \frac{p; \Omega \vdash s_1 \Downarrow () \Rightarrow \Omega' \quad p; \Omega' \vdash \{s_2; \dots; s_n\} \Downarrow v \Rightarrow \Omega''}{p; \Omega \vdash \{s_1; \dots; s_n\} \Downarrow v \Rightarrow \Omega''} \\ \\ \text{EVALBLOCKONE} \quad \text{EVALBLOCKASSTATEMENT} \\ \frac{p; \Omega \vdash s \Downarrow v \Rightarrow \Omega'}{p; \Omega \vdash \{s\} \Downarrow v \Rightarrow \Omega'} \quad \frac{p; \Omega \vdash b \Downarrow v \Rightarrow \Omega'}{p; \Omega \vdash b \Downarrow v \Rightarrow \Omega' \cap \Omega} \end{array}$$

Finally, we can define the top-level rule that specifies the execution of a function, given the values of its arguments.

$$\frac{\text{EVALFUNC} \quad \text{fn } f(x_1 : \tau_1, \dots, x_n : \tau_n) \rightarrow \mu \text{ b} \in p \quad p; x_1 \mapsto v_1, \dots, x_n \mapsto v_n \vdash b \Downarrow v}{p \vdash f(v_1, \dots, v_n) \Downarrow v}$$

Typing. While the operational semantics of `hacspec` are simple, its typing judgment is trickier. This judgment has to replicate Rust’s typechecking on our restricted subset, including borrow-checking. The other complicated part of Rust typechecking, trait resolution, is currently out of `hacspec`’s scope, even though some polymorphism could be introduced in future work to `hacspec` via a limited use of Rust traits.

The typing judgment for expressions is the following:

$$\Gamma; \Delta \vdash e : \tau \Rightarrow \Gamma'$$

Δ is a dictionary mapping type names to their definition, since Rust’s type system is nominal rather than structural. Γ is the important context, since it maps variables to their types. The typing judgment saying that e has type τ also returns a new context Γ' because of linearity. Rust’s type system contains some linearity as the ownership of a non-borrowed variable is exclusive. Using a linear variable is akin to a “move” in Rust’s terminology. To replicate this linearity and match Rust’s typechecking behavior, `hacspec`’s typechecking context Γ is modified by the typechecking as some variables may be consumed: $\Gamma' \subset \Gamma$.

The full typechecking semantics can be found in §A. It largely follows the traditional structure of a linear typechecking judgment. The tricky part concerns the handling of immutable borrowing for function arguments. Here are the rules:

$$\frac{\text{TYPFUNCALL} \quad f : (\mu_1, \dots, \mu_n) \rightarrow \tau \in \Gamma \quad \Delta \vdash \Gamma = \Gamma_1 \circ \dots \circ \Gamma_n \quad \forall i \in [1, n], \Gamma_i; \Delta \vdash a_i \sim \mu_i \Rightarrow \Gamma'_i \quad \Delta \vdash \Gamma' = \Gamma'_1 \circ \dots \circ \Gamma'_n}{\Gamma; \Delta \vdash f(a_1, \dots, a_n) : \tau \Rightarrow \Gamma'}$$

```
foo(&(x, x))
- ^ value used here after move
|
value moved here
```

Figure 6. Rust error message for function argument borrowing

$$\begin{array}{c} \text{TYPFUNARG} \quad \text{TYPFUNARGBORROW} \\ \frac{\Gamma; \Delta \vdash e : \tau \Rightarrow \Gamma'}{\Gamma; \Delta \vdash e \sim \tau \Rightarrow \Gamma'} \quad \frac{\Gamma; \Delta \vdash e : \mu \Rightarrow \Gamma'}{\Gamma; \Delta \vdash \&e \sim \&\mu \Rightarrow \Gamma'} \\ \\ \text{TYPFUNARGBORROWVAR} \\ \frac{\Gamma; \Delta \vdash x : \mu \Rightarrow _}{\Gamma; \Delta \vdash \&x \sim \&\mu \Rightarrow \Gamma} \end{array}$$

$\Delta \vdash \Gamma = \Gamma_1 \circ \dots \circ \Gamma_n$ corresponds to a linear split of the context. `TYPFUNCALL` follows a standard pattern for linear typing: it splits the context between the arguments of the function, typechecks the arguments and builds a new context out of the argument’s resulting context.

While `TYPFUNARG` and `TYPFUNARGBORROW` are transparent, `TYPFUNARGBORROWVAR` is the trickiest rule to explain. Let us imagine you are calling the function `foo(&(x,x))` where x is a non-borrowed, non-copyable value. The Rust compiler will give you the error message of Fig. 6.

This means that even though the argument of the function is borrowed, the borrowing happens after the typechecking of the borrowed term using regular rules and linearity. However, if you were to typecheck `foo(&x, &x)` Rust’s typechecker would not complain because the borrowing directly affects x , and not an object of which x is a part of.

This unintuitive feature of the type system becomes more regular when looking at a desugared representation of the code like `MIR`. But in our type system, we have to include several rules like `TYPFUNARGBORROWVAR` to reflect it. Since we deal with the surface syntax of Rust, these special rules for borrows are necessary. Although `hacspec` does not currently include structs, we expect special rules to be added to deal with borrowing struct fields. Note that the syntax of `hacspec` only allows array indexing to be done via $x[e]$ instead of the more general $e_1[e_2]$, with the objective of keeping rules simple, since indexing implies borrowing in Rust.

2.3. Implementation

We implement the syntax and type system presented above in the `hacspec` typechecker. Programmers need tooling that help them stay within the bounds of the language, and it is precisely the role of the `hacspec` typechecker, which kicks in after the regular Rust typechecker.

Compiler Architecture. The `hacspec` typechecker is completely implemented in Rust, integrated into the regular Rust ecosystem of `cargo` and the Rust compiler. As such, programmers that already use Rust need not to install complex dependencies to use `hacspec`. Concretely, the `hacspec` typechecker uses the `rustc_driver`¹ crate, offering direct access to the Rust compiler API. The Rust

1. https://doc.rust-lang.org/nightly/nightly-rustc/rustc_driver/

```

error[hacspe]: type not allowed in hacspe
--> hacspe-poly1305/src/poly1305.rs:61:17
|
61 | pub fn poly(m: &[U8], key: KeyPoly) -> Tag {
|

```

Figure 7. `hacspe` error message

compiler is architected as a series of translations between several intermediate representations:

$$\text{AST} \xrightarrow{\text{desugaring}} \text{HIR} \xrightarrow{\text{to CFG}} \text{MIR} \xrightarrow{\text{to LLVM}} \text{LLVM IR}$$

The borrow checking and typechecking are bound to be performed exclusively on MIR, making it the richest and most interesting IR to target as a verification toolchain input. However, MIR’s structure is quite far from the original Rust AST. For instance, MIR is control-flow-graph-based (CFG) and its control flow is destructured, making it hard for a deductive verification toolchain to recover the structure needed to host loop invariants. For `hacspe`, we chose to take the Rust AST as our input, for two reasons.

First, choosing the AST moves the formalization of `hacspe` closer to the Rust source code, making it easier to understand. Second, it enables a compilation to the target verification toolchains that preserves the overall look of the code, easing the transition from Rust to the verified backends, and the communication between a cryptography expert and a proof engineer. This choice makes `hacspe` quite different from the other Rust-based verification tools discussed in §5.2.

Three-tier Typechecking. The `hacspe` typechecker operates in three phases.

In the first phase, the program goes through its regular flow inside the Rust compiler, up to regular Rust typechecking. Second, the Rust surface AST is translated into a smaller AST, matching the formal syntax of `hacspe`. Third, a typechecking phase following the formal typechecking rules of `hacspe` is run on this restricted AST.

The second phase is the most helpful for the developers, as it will yield useful error messages whenever the program does not fall within the `hacspe` subset of Rust. The error messages look like regular error messages emitted by the Rust compiler, as shown in figure 7.

Here, the error message points at the native Rust slice being used, which is forbidden since native Rust slices are not part of `hacspe` (the corresponding type is `ByteSeq`). These error messages are a key component of the security-oriented aspect of `hacspe`, since they enforce the subset limits at compile-time rather than at execution time. The goal of this tooling is to make it impossible for the programmer to unknowingly break the abstraction of the subset.

The third phase, corresponding to `hacspe`’s typechecking, should never yield any error since the program has at this point already been type-checked by Rust. If the program had a typing problem, it should have been caught by the Rust typechecker first and never come to this third phase. However, the `hacspe` typechecker still catches some restrictions of `hacspe` subset that are not purely syntactic, and therefore pass the second phase.

Interacting With The Rust typechecker. The first kind of errors caught by the third phase concerns external function calls. Indeed, one should only call in `hacspe` functions that are within the bounds of `hacspe`. But this rule suffers some exceptions, the main one being the primitive functions of the `hacspe` library that operate on base types such as `Seq`, whose behavior is part of the trusted computing base. Another issue is the import of functions defined outside of the current crate. The import of the `hacspe` library is recognized by the `hacspe` typechecker and given special treatment, but we also allow importing regular crates. This allows `hacspe` programs to enjoy some kind of modularity, as programs can be distributed over several crates. The `hacspe` typechecker uses the Rust compiler’s “crate metadata reader” to import function definitions from external crates, and scan their signatures. If the signature of an imported function typechecks in `hacspe`, then its use is valid and does not yield an error. This behavior, while practical, leaves a gap opened for breaking the abstraction of the subset. Indeed, one could import a function whose signature is in `hacspe`, but its body is not, thereby increasing the trusted computing base. A solution to this problem would be to define an allow-list of valid `hacspe` functions via Rust’s attribute system, but technical constraints on the Rust compiler (custom attributes are erased from crate metadata) makes this solution inoperable. A better system to close this potential abstraction leak is left as future work.

The second kind of errors yielded by the third phase of `hacspe` program processing relates to type inference. The `hacspe` typechecking procedure does not support any kind of type inference, unlike regular Rust typechecking. Nevertheless, idiomatic Rust programs often rely on type inference for things like integer literal types, or methods operating on parametrized types. Hence, `hacspe` forces programmers to explicitly annotate their integer literals with their type, using regular Rust syntax like `1u32`. This issue also arises with methods. `hacspe`’s syntax does not include methods because a method call is the same as calling a function whose first argument is the `self`. However, this assumes that method resolution has already been performed. This is not the case when taking the Rust AST as an input, which means that the `hacspe` typechecker has to replicate the Rust method resolution algorithm. The algorithm is very simple: it typechecks the first `self` argument, then looks into a map from types to functions if the type contains the correct function being called. This behavior is more complicated with parametric types such as `Seq`, introducing a nested map for the type parameter, but keeps the same principle. Hence, and because of the lack of type inference, the programmer has to explicitly annotate the type parameter of methods concerning parametric types, using regular Rust syntax like `Seq::<U8>::new(16)`.

3. The `hacspe` Libraries

The `hacspe` language alone is not sufficient to write meaningful programs. Indeed, cryptographic and security-oriented programs manipulate a wide range of values that need to be represented in `hacspe`. To that purpose, we provide several Rust standalone libraries that implement security-related abstractions. Although these libraries are

tightly integrated in `hacspect`, they can be used individually in regular Rust applications.

3.1. Secret Integers

Timing side-channels are some of the most important threats to cryptographic software, with many CVEs for popular libraries appearing every year. To mitigate these attacks, cryptographic code is usually written to be *secret independent*: the code never branches on a secret value and it never uses a secret index to access an array. This discipline is sometimes called *constant time coding* and many verification tools try to enforce these rules at compile time or in the generated assembly [8], [3].

We follow the approach of `HACL*` [48] to enforce secret independence at the source-code level using the standard Rust typechecker. We build a library of secret machine integers that contains wrapped versions of all machine integer types, signed and unsigned, supported by Rust. These wrappers define a new type `U8`, `U32`,... corresponding to each integer type `u8`, `u32`,... in Rust. To define our secret integer types, we make use of Rust’s `struct` declaration semantics and nominal typing, which differs from a simple type alias introduced with `type`.

For each integer type, the library defines only the operations that are known to be constant-time, *i.e.* operations that are likely to be compiled to constant-time instructions in most assembly architectures. Hence, secret integers support addition, subtraction, multiplication (but not division), shifting and rotation (for public shift values), bitwise operators, conversions to and from big- and little-endian bytearrays, and constant-time masked comparison.

Secret integers can be converted to and from regular Rust integers, but only by calling an explicit operation. The library provides the functions `classify` and `declassify`, to make visible in the code the points where there is an information flow between public and secret. Hence, a Rust program that uses secret integers but never calls `declassify` is guaranteed to be secret independent at the source-code level. We have carefully curated the integer operations to ensure so that the Rust compiler should preserve this guarantee down to assembly, but this is not a formal guarantee, and the generated assembly should still be verified using other tools. However, our methodology provides early feedback to the developer and allows them to eliminate an entire class of software side-channels.

Secret integers are extensively used in `hacspect` programs to check that our code does not inadvertently leak secrets. However, these libraries can also be used outside `hacspect` to add protections to any Rust program. The developer simply replaces the types all potentially secret values (keys, messages, internal cryptographic state) from `u8`, `u32`,... to `U8`, `U32`,... and uses the Rust typechecker to point out typing failures that may indicate timing leaks. The developer can then selectively add `declassify` in cases that they carefully audit and deem safe. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first static analysis technique that can analyze Rust cryptographic code for secret independence.

3.2. Fixed-length Arrays

Formal specifications of software components often need to use arrays and sequences, but for clarity of

specification and ease of translation to purely functional specifications in languages like Coq and F^* , we believe that `hacspect` programs should only use arrays in simple ways. Any sophisticated use of mutable or extensible arrays can quickly make a specification muddled and bug-prone and its invariants harder to understand. Consequently, in `hacspect`, we only allow fixed-length arrays that cannot be extended (unlike the variable-size `Vec` type provided by Rust).

The `hacspect` library includes two kinds of fixed-length arrays. The go-to type is `Seq`, which models a fixed-length sequence of any type. `Seq` supports a large number of operations such as indexing, slicing and chunking. The Rust typechecker ensures that the contents of the `Seq` have the correct type, and C-like array pointer casting is forbidden. This forces the user to properly cast the contents of the array rather than casting the array pointer itself, which can be a source of bugs.

However, `Seq` has a blind spot triggered by a lot of usual cryptographic specifications bugs: array bounds checking. `Seq`, like `Vec`, will trigger a dynamic error if one tries to access an index outside its bounds. This Rust dynamic error is better than the C undefined behavior (usually resulting in a segfault), but is not enough for our security-oriented goals. A full proof that array accesses are always within bounds typically requires the use of a fully-fledged proof assistant, as we’ll see in §4. But the `hacspect` libraries offers a mechanism to bake into Rust’s typechecking part of this array bound proof.

This mechanism is offered by the `array!` macro. `array!(State, U32, 16)` is the declaration of a named Rust type that will correspond to an array of 16 secret 32-bit (secret) integers. The length of 16 is baked into Rust’s type-system via the underlying use of the `[U32;16]` Rust native array type. Using such a native known-length array type compared to a regular `Seq` has multiple advantages.

First, the `array!(State, U32, 16)` macro call defines all the methods of the `State` type on-the-spot, and uses its length to provide debug assertions and dynamic error messages that help the user with the extra information that `State`’s length should always be 16, whereas a `Seq` can have any length. Moreover, the `State` constructor expects a literal Rust array of 16 integers, whose length can be directly checked by Rust’s typechecker.

Second, the use of `array!(State, U32, 16)` acts as a length hint to the verification backends of `hacspect`. Known-length arrays act as control points in the proof that help inference of array lengths during the array bounds proof.

While the two first advantages help increase the correctness of the `hacspect` program, they often come as a burden to programmers which have to annotate their program with explicit casts between `Seq` and `array!`-declared types. However, a third advantage of the underlying native known-length array type compensates the annoyance. Indeed, `Seq`, as `Vec`, does not implement the `Copy` trait and therefore has to be explicitly `.clone()` every time it is used multiple times without borrowing. As mutable borrowing is forbidden in `hacspect`, this would lead to a high-number of `.clone()` calls for `Seq` values mutated and used in the programs. But since `array!` uses Rust’s native known-length array that implement `Copy`, their manipulation does not require any explicit `.clone()` call. This feature is

```

1 public_nat_mod! (
2     type_name: FieldElement,
3     type_of_canvas: FieldCanvas,
4     bit_size_of_field: 131,
5     modulo_value:
6         "03ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffb"
7 );

```

Figure 8. Declaration of a (public) modular natural number in hacspect

especially helpful for cryptographic code, which usually manipulates small-sized chunks (represented using `array!`) coming from a few big messages (represented using `Seq`).

3.3. Modular Natural Integers

Many cryptographic algorithms rely on mathematical constructs like finite fields, groups, rings, and elliptic curves. Our goal is to provide libraries for all these constructions in `hacspect`, so that the programmer can specify cryptographic components using high-level concepts, without worrying about how to implement them.

For example, one of the most common needs for cryptographic code is modular arithmetic, that is the field of natural numbers between 0 and n with all arithmetic operations performed modulo n . For example, by setting n to a power of 2, we can build large integer types like `u256`; by setting it to a prime, we obtain a prime field; by choosing a product of primes, we get an RSA field etc.

We provide a dedicated library for arbitrary-precision modular natural integers, that can be manipulated by Rust programs just like machine integer values, without worrying about any allocation or deallocation. Fig. 8 shows what a finite field declaration looks like, taken from the Poly1305 specification. The `public_nat_mod!` macro call defines a fresh Rust type, `FieldElement`, along with multiple methods corresponding to operations on these natural integers. The two next arguments of the macro call concern the underlying representation of the natural integer.

Our implementation of modular arithmetic relies on Rust’s `BigInt` crate². But `BigInt` does not implement the `Copy` trait and is therefore cumbersome to use, requiring the insertion of numerous `.clone()` calls. To bypass this limitation, `hacspect`’s modular integers use a concrete representation as a big-endian, fixed-length array of bytes. The length of this array is determined using the `bit_size_of_field` argument of the macro call. The methods of `FieldElement` constantly switch back and forth between the `Copyable` array representation and its `BigInt` equivalent to get the computations right.

The `modulo_value` argument contains the value for the modulus n as a hex string because the value can be arbitrarily large and often cannot fit inside a `u128` literal. The `type_of_canvas: FieldCanvas` argument is required merely because of Rust’s macro system fundamental limitation of forcing the user to explicitly provide the identifier for all the types declared by the macro. Indeed, the macro defines two types: `FieldCanvas` is the type for the underlying array-of-bytes representation of the bounded natural integers, that enjoys the `Copy` trait. `FieldElement`

is a wrapper around `FieldCanvas` that takes the modulo value into account for all its operations.

`hacspect`’s natural modular integers also come in two versions, public and secret. The secret version can only be converted to arrays of secret integers, ensuring the continuity of information flow checking across machine and natural integers. However, the underlying modular arithmetic operations themselves are not constant-time, so this inter-conversion serves primarily to document information flow, not to enforce secret independence.

The seamless interoperability provided by `hacspect` between machine integers and modular natural integers allows programmers to mix in different styles of specifications, ranging from high-level math-like to low-level implementation-like code. `hacspect` allows programmers to write and test code at both levels and bridge the gap between them, by allowing them to interoperate, and also though formal verification, as we’ll see in §4.

4. Connecting hacspect To Theorem Provers

`hacspect` is a security-oriented domain-specific language embedded in Rust, along with a set of useful libraries for cryptographic specifications. However, as strong as Rust type system is, it is not sufficient to catch common errors like array indexing problems at compile time. To increase the level of assurance on the correctness of specifications written in `hacspect`, we implement one backends from `hacspect` to state-of-the art verification frameworks: `F*` [45] (§4.1). By using this backend, that could easily be extended to other frameworks like and `Easycrypt` [9] (§4.4), the `hacspect` programmer can further debug specifications, find non-trivial errors which may have escaped manual audits, and formally connect the specification to an optimized verified implementation (§4.2). We demonstrate this approach on a library of classic cryptographic primitives (§4.3).

4.1. Translating hacspect to F*

The functional semantics of the `hacspect` language makes it easy to compile it to the `F*` language. To illustrate this claim, Fig. 9 and Fig. 10 show what the same function, the main loop of the Poly1305 specification, looks like both in `hacspect` and after its translation to `F*`.

The translation is very regular, as each `hacspect` assignment is translated to an `F*` let-binding. Variable names are suffixed with indexes coming from a name resolution pass happening in the `hacspect` typechecker, to ensure that the scoping semantics are preserved by the compilation. Apart from syntax changes, the bulk of this translation relates to the functional purification of the mutable variables involved in loop and conditional statements. This approach is similar to the earlier work of `Electrolysis` [46], although much simpler because we do not deal with mutable references.

However, `hacspect` features mutable plain variables which can be reassigned throughout the program. These reassignments are always translated into functional let-bindings, but since statements are translated into expressions during the compilation to `F*`, the assignment side-effects have to be hoisted upwards in the let-binding corresponding to conditional or loop statements. For example,

2. <https://crates.io/crates/bigint>

```

1 pub fn poly(m: &ByteSeq, key: KeyPoly) -> Tag {
2   let r = le_bytes_to_num(&key.slice(0, BLOCKSIZE));
3   let r = clamp(r);
4   let s = le_bytes_to_num(
5     &key.slice(BLOCKSIZE, BLOCKSIZE));
6   let s = FieldElement::from_secret_literal(s);
7   let mut a = FieldElement::from_literal(0u128);
8   for i in 0..m.num_chunks(BLOCKSIZE) {
9     let (len, block) =
10       m.get_chunk(BLOCKSIZE, i);
11     let block_uint = le_bytes_to_num(&block);
12     let n = encode(block_uint, len);
13     a = a + n;
14     a = r * a;
15   }
16   poly_finish(a, s)
17 }

```

Figure 9. Poly1305 main loop in hacspect

```

1 let poly (m_15: byte_seq) (key_16: key_poly) : tag =
2   let r_17 = le_bytes_to_num
3     (array_slice (key_16) (usize 0) (blocksize))
4   in
5   let r_18 = clamp (r_17) in
6   let s_19 = le_bytes_to_num
7     (array_slice (key_16) (blocksize) (blocksize))
8   in
9   let s_20 = nat_from_secret_literal
10     (0x03fffffffffffffffffffffb) (s_19)
11   in
12   let a_21 = nat_from_literal
13     (0x03fffffffffffffffffffffb) (pub_u128 0x0)
14   in
15   let (a_21) = foldi
16     (usize 0) (seq_num_chunks (m_15) (blocksize))
17     (λ i_22 (a_21) →
18       let (len_23, block_24) =
19         seq_get_chunk (m_15) (blocksize) (i_22)
20       in
21       let block_uint_25 = le_bytes_to_num (block_24) in
22       let n_26 = encode (block_uint_25) (len_23) in
23       let a_21 = (a_21) +% (n_26) in
24       let a_21 = (r_18) *% (a_21) in
25       (a_21))
26   in
27   poly_finish (a_21) (s_20)
28

```

Figure 10. Poly1305 main loop in F*, compiled from Fig. 9

see the translation of the loop statement lines 8 to 15 of Fig. 9, to the loop expression lines 15 to 27 of Fig. 10.

While conditional and loop statements constitute the main structural changes of the translation, most of the compiler implementation work goes into connecting the libraries handling arithmetic and sequences in F*. Fortunately, this task is simplified by having access to the rich typing environment provided by the hacspect typechecker, which allows us to insert annotations and hints into the generated F*, significantly easing the out-of-the box typechecking of the translated programs. For instance, `FieldElement::from_secret_literal(s)` (line 6 of Fig. 9) is translated to the F* expression `nat_from_secret_literal(0x03ff[...]ffb) (s_19)` (lines 9-10 of Fig. 10). The modulo value of the `FieldElement` integer type has been automatically added during the translation, as a hint to F* typechecking.

Overall, these annotations added automatically during

```

1 for i=1 upto ceil(msg length in bytes / 16)
2   n = le_bytes_to_num(
3     msg[ ((i-1)*16)..(i*16)] | [0x01])
4   a += n
5   a = (r * a) % p
6 end

```

```

11 let block_uint = le_bytes_to_num(
12   &m.slice(BLOCKSIZE * i, BLOCKSIZE));

```

```

21 let block_uint_1876 = le_bytes_to_num (
22   seq_slice (m_1868)
23     ((blocksize) * (i_1875))
24     (blocksize))
25 in

```

```

(Error 19) Subtyping check failed;
expected type len: uint_size{
  blocksize * i_22 + len <= Lib.Seq.length m_15
};
got type uint_size; The SMT solver could not prove
the query, try to spell your proof in more detail
or increase fuel/ifucl

```

Figure 11. RFC 8439: first, the main Poly1305 loop pseudocode containing the bug. Then in second and third, corresponding buggy snippets in hacspect and F* (line numbers of Fig. 9 and Fig. 10). Fourth: F* error message catching the bug

the translation enable smooth typechecking and verification inside F*. The only manual proof annotations still needed in F* concern logical pre-conditions and loop invariants that cannot be expressed using the Rust type system.

4.2. The Benefits Of Using Theorem Provers

Finding Specifications Bugs. Once embedded in F*, various properties out of reach of the Rust type system can be proven correct about the specification. The most obvious of these properties is the correctness of array indexing.

RFC 8439 [39] is the second version of the ChaCha20Poly1305 RFC, written after a number of errata were reported on the previous version. However, the second version still contains a specification flaw that illustrates the need for debugging specifications with proof assistants. RFC 8439 defines the core loop in Poly1305 in a way that overruns the message if its length is not a multiple of 16. Fig. 11 shows the RFC8439 pseudocode, as well as its corresponding snippets in hacspect and F*.

In our hacspect code, the `get_chunk` function always provides the correct chunk length, preventing the bug. However, if we tried to precisely mimic the RFC pseudocode, we would have introduced the bug, which would not have been caught by the Rust or hacspect typecheckers. The issue could have been uncovered by careful testing, but we note that the standard test vectors did not prevent the introduction of this bug in the RFC.

We claim that using F* to typecheck specifications can help optimize the specification development workflow by catching this kind of bugs early. The bug of RFC 8439 is indeed detected by F* with a helpful error message. hacspect offers an integrated experience for cryptographic specification development: a cryptographer can write a

Primitive / Lines of code	hacspeg	HACL*
ChaCha20	132	191
Poly1305	77	77
Chacha20Poly1305	59	89
NTRU-Prime	95	—
SHA3	173	227
Curve25519	107	124
SHA256	148	219*

Figure 12. Cryptographic Primitives written in hacspeg, lines of code count. The HACL* column is included as reference. *: the HACL* SHA2 specification covers all versions of SHA2, not just 256.

Rust-embedded hacspeg program that looks like pseudocode, and do a first round of debugging with testing since hacspeg programs are executable. Then, the cryptographer can translate the specification to F* where a proof engineer can prove array-indexing and other properties correct.

Proving Functional Equivalence. Once the specification has been fixed and proven correct, an optimized implementation is required for the cryptographic primitive or protocol to be embedded in a real-world application. There is often a wide gap between the specification and the optimized code, and this spot is where formal methods have proven their usefulness in the past. Proof assistants like F* enable proving the functional equivalence between a specification and an optimized implementation. hacspeg fits nicely into this process, since it directly provides the specification in the language of the proof assistant (here F*), based on hacspeg code that can be audited by cryptographers.

4.3. A Library Of Cryptographic Specifications

To evaluate the hacspeg language, libraries, type-checker and compiler, we build a library of popular cryptographic algorithms in hacspeg, presented in Fig. 12. For each primitive, we wrote a hacspeg specification that typechecks in Rust and with the hacspeg typechecker. Then, we translated some of these primitives to F* and typechecked the result with the proof assistant.

Some annotations (maximum 2-3 per primitive) are needed to typecheck the specifications in the proof assistants. These annotations concern bounds for array indexes passed as function parameters, as well as some loop invariants. In the future, we may extend the Rust-embedded syntax of hacspeg to include design-by-contracts annotations. This functionality is already provided by crates like `contracts`³, where the annotations are incorporated into `Rust debug_assert!` assertions.

These hacspeg specifications have been extensively tested and can be used as prototype crypto implementations when building and debugging larger Rust applications. Further, they form the basis for our verification workflow.

4.4. Translating to EasyCrypt and other Tools

While proof assistants are powerful, they are often specialized. In the cryptography space, Fiat-crypto uses Coq and generate C implementations for elliptic curves [28], and Jasmin covers more kinds of primitives using EasyCrypt [9] but only targets assembly [2]. HACL* [48]

and Vale [19], both using the F* proof assistant, are currently the only instance of proven-correct interoperability between C and assembly [32].

In this context, hacspeg is a way to break the integration silo imposed by proof assistant frameworks which typically cannot interoperate. The simplicity of the hacspeg language semantics, close to a first-order functional language, makes it easy to translate in the specification languages of most proof assistants.

To demonstrate this claim, we present a second backend to the hacspeg implementation, targeting EasyCrypt. The translation from hacspeg to EasyCrypt is very similar to the translation from hacspeg to F*. Actually, the main difficulty of implementing this new backend lies in connecting the libraries expected by hacspeg to the existing libraries of the proof assistant. The resulting EasyCrypt specification can then be related to optimized assembly code written in Jasmin [4]. Indeed, the implementations of ChaCha20 and Poly1305 in Jasmin rely on an EasyCrypt specification that was manually transpiled from the HACL* specifications for these primitives. Our tools make it possible to automate this step by directly translating the hacspeg specifications to both F* and EasyCrypt, and safely compose implementations from HACL* and Jasmin.

5. Related And Future Work

5.1. Cryptographic Specification Languages

hacspeg is not the first domain-specific language targeting cryptographic specifications. The most notable works in this domain include Cryptol [30], Jasmin [2], and Usuba [37]. There are two main differences between hacspeg and these languages.

The first difference is the embedded nature of hacspeg’s language. By leveraging the existing Rust ecosystem, we believe it is easier for programmers to use our language, compared to the effort of learning a new domain-specific language with its different syntax. We extend this claim to the tooling of the domain-specific language, which is written completely in the host language (Rust) and therefore does not require installing any extra dependency with whom the developer might be unfamiliar (like an entire OCaml or Haskell stack).

The second difference is the target of the domain-specific language. Cryptol targets C and VHDL, Jasmin targets assembly and Usuba targets C. Cryptol and Jasmin each are closely integrated with their respective proof assistants/verification backend: SAW [26] and EasyCrypt [9]. The code written in those domain-specific languages is closer to an implementation than a specification, as it is directly compiled to a performant target and is sometimes proven correct against a more high-level specification (like libjc [4]). Instead, hacspeg can target different verification toolchains and acts as a bridge between those projects.

5.2. Rust-based Verification Tools

hacspeg is not the first attempt at a Rust frontend for verification toolchains; we provide a summary of existing work in Fig. 13. The “input” column of the comparison table refers to the entry point of the verification frameworks withing the Rust compiler architecture, as discussed in §2.3.

3. <https://crates.io/crates/contracts>

Frontend	Target(s)	Input	Formal
KLEE [35]	KLEE [21]	MIR	○
crux-mir [33]	SAW [26]	MIR	○
Prusti [5]	Viper [38]	MIR	●
Electrolysis [46]	Lean [23]	MIR	●
SMACK [6]	SMACK [43]	LLVM IR	●
RustHorn [36]	CHC [15]	MIR	●
μ MIR [25]	WhyML [31]	MIR	●
hacspect	F* [45], EasyCrypt [9]	AST	●

- = DSL and translation to target not formalized
 ● = DSL defined by its translation to formalized target
 ● = DSL formalized but not the translation to target(s)
 ● = DSL and translation to target formalized

Figure 13. Rust frontends for verification toolchains

We also classify the previous work according to the extent of formalization that they contain. Indeed, multiple things can be formalized when creating an embedded domain-specific language. First, the domain-specific language can be defined as a subset of a formalization of the host language. In the case of Rust, only RustBelt [34] currently provides a full formalization. But no existing tool that uses RustBelt can extract to another target. On the other hand, the domain-specific language can be defined intrinsically in terms of its encoding in the formalized target (●). Finally, the domain-specific language itself can be formalized (●), as well as its translation to the formalized target (●).

We intend for *hacspect* to belong to the last category, corresponding to the ● case. However, we chose to prioritize the interoperability of *hacspect* by targeting multiple backends, which increases the workload of translation formalization. Hence, we leave the migration from ● to ● as future work.

The main difference of *hacspect* compared to previous Rust frontend is the scope of the subset it intends to capture. Indeed, *hacspect* does not deal with mutable state and borrows, which is the heart of Rust. On the contrary, *hacspect* explicitly forbids these as its aim is to capture the functional, pure subset of Rust. Of course, this makes it unsuitable for verifying any kind of performance-oriented programs. Instead, we believe such programs should be dealt with using the methodology described in §?? *hacspect* provides to Rust programmers an entry point into the verification world, inside the ecosystem that they are familiar with.

5.3. Future work

There are two main directions for future work on *hacspect*. The first direction concern its usability as a set of tools to write security-oriented Rust specifications. The *hacspect* language could be augmented with idiomatic Rust features that do not break its functional core and semantics, like algebraic data types (structs and enums not containing references). More value types can be added to handle more complex mathematical objects necessary for cryptographic specifications, like probability distributions for post-quantum cryptography.

The second direction for improvement deals with the formal foundations of *hacspect*. The compilation from *hacspect* to F* and/or EasyCrypt could be formalized

and proven correct, either on paper or mechanically. The nature of *hacspect*'s embedding inside Rust could also be explored, either by evaluating a reference interpreter of the language on a subset of Rust's official test suite, or by formally proving that *hacspect*'s semantics are a special case of a larger semantics like Oxide or Rustbelt.

Overall, *hacspect*'s goal is fairly different from any of the existing Rust frontends for verification frameworks. The domain-specific language can be viewed as a language for writing contracts and specifications for Rust functions within Rust, going beyond simple annotations. A third possible direction for future work would be to explore *hacspect*'s relevance outside the world of cryptography, e.g. in systems programming.

Open Source Development

hacspect is being collaboratively developed on an open GitHub repository: <https://github.com/hacspect/hacspect>. The repository contains:

- the Rust source code of the *hacspect* typechecker and compilers to F* and EasyCrypt (see §2.3);
- the Rust source code of the *hacspect* libraries (see §3);
- a library of cryptographic specifications written in *hacspect*;
- the F* source code compiled from these specifications (see §4.1);
- Rust bindings for the Evercrypt [42] API provided by HACL*;

The Rust code is self-documented using *rustdoc* but various readmes and Makefiles are provided to guide developers on correctly using the toolchain.

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Appendix

Full hacspeg formalization

The hacspeg language, being embedded in Rust, shares with it some linearity properties of its type system. However, we severely restrict the borrowing feature: while retaining enough expressive power to write cryptographic specifications, the language behaves much simpler.

The typing judgment presented here does not cover all the features of the hacspeg implementation. It focuses on the core of the language, its interesting type system and execution semantics. More precisely, we did not include the following elements :

- anything that can easily be desugared like assignment operators ($+=$, etc);
- the `if` expression, that coexists with the `if` statement;
- all the various types of integers, the casts between them and all the operators to manipulate them (we only have basic `int` type with arithmetic);
- type inference;
- polymorphism and traits, as we assume that the Rust compiler does the job of monomorphizing everything for us.

Typing

Contrasting with the operational semantics, the typing rules are fairly complex and restrictive. The reason for this complexity is our objective to stick to Rust behavior.

The typing environnement of hacspeg is fairly standard. We need a type dictionary to enforce the named type discipline of Rust that covers the types declared by the `array!` macro. Please note that the contexts Γ and Δ are considered as unordered maps rather than ordered associative lists. As such, the rules have the relevant elements appear at the end or the beginning of those contexts without loss of generality.

Typing context (unordered map)	Γ	$::=$	\emptyset $ \quad x : \tau, \Gamma$ $ \quad f : ([\tau]^+) \rightarrow \mu, \Gamma$
Type dictionary (unordered map)	Δ	$::=$	\emptyset $ \quad t \rightarrow [\mu; n \in \mathbb{N}], \Delta$

The restrictions on borrowing lead to severe limitations on how we can manipulate values of linear type in our language, rendering it quite useless at first sight. Indeed, when you receive a reference as a function argument, you can only use it in expressions and perform identity let bindings with it. You cannot store it in memory or in a tuple and pass it around indirectly in your program. This behavior is well-suited for input and output buffers in cryptographic code.

However, in the spirit of Rust, we introduce an escape hatch from linearity under the form of the `Copy` trait implementation. This trait, that is primitive to the Rust language, is used to distinguish the values that are “cheap” to copy. This concerns all the reference-free μ types except `Seq`, whose size is not known at compilation time (and thus can be arbitrarily large). Paradoxically, `array!` types that can be as large as their `Seq` counterparts do benefit from the `Copy` trait; we replicate here the behavior of Rust. Indeed, because the length is known at compilation time, the code generation backend of Rust (LLVM) can optimize the representation of the array in memory, especially if the size is small.

With this setup, both `array!` and `Seq` represent a table of data. The moral difference between them is that `array!` is a table passed by value, whereas `Seq` is a table passed by reference (immutable). In the cryptographic specifications, `Seq` is mostly used for input and output messages, whose length is known only at runtime. Fixed-size chunks or blocks of data are rather implemented using `array!`.

Implementing the `Copy` trait $\Delta \vdash \tau : \text{Copy}$

COPYUNIT

$\Delta \vdash \text{unit} : \text{Copy}$

COPYBOOL

$\Delta \vdash \text{bool} : \text{Copy}$

COPYINT

$\Delta \vdash \text{int} : \text{Copy}$

COPYTUPLE

$\Delta \vdash \tau_1 : \text{Copy} \quad \dots \quad \Delta \vdash \tau_n : \text{Copy}$

$\Delta \vdash (\tau_1, \dots, \tau_n) : \text{Copy}$

COPYARRAY

$\Delta \vdash \mu : \text{Copy}$

$t \rightarrow [\mu; n], \Delta \vdash t : \text{Copy}$

Because Rust has an affine type system, hacspeg also enjoys an affine typing context with associated splitting rules (SPLITLINEAR). Please note that immutable references values can be duplicated freely in the context (SPLITDUPLICABLE). During an elaboration phase inside the Rust compiler, the linearity of the type system gets circumvented for `Copy` values with the insertion of `clone()` functions call that perform a copy of the value wherever the linear type system forces a copy of the value to be made. We formalize this behavior here by allowing `Copy` types duplication in the typing context, like immutable references (SPLITCOPY). Lastly, functions are always duplicable in

the context (SPLITFUNCTION). In the following, Γ behaves like an unordered map from variables to their types.

Context splitting	$\Delta \vdash \Gamma = \Gamma_1 \circ \Gamma_2$
Borrowed context splitting	$\Delta \vdash \Gamma = \Gamma_1 \circ \Gamma_2$
SPLITEMPTY	SPLITLINEAR1
$\Delta \vdash \emptyset = \emptyset \circ \emptyset$	$\Delta \vdash \Gamma = \Gamma_1 \circ \Gamma_2$
	$\Delta \vdash x : \tau, \Gamma = (x : \tau, \Gamma_1) \circ \Gamma_2$
SPLITLINEAR2	
$\Delta \vdash \Gamma = \Gamma_1 \circ \Gamma_2$	
$\Delta \vdash x : \tau, \Gamma = \Gamma_1 \circ (x : \tau, \Gamma_2)$	
SPLITDUPLICABLE	
$\Delta \vdash \Gamma = \Gamma_1 \circ \Gamma_2$	
$\Delta \vdash x : \&\tau, \Gamma = (x : \&\tau, \Gamma_1) \circ (x : \&\tau, \Gamma_2)$	
SPLITCOPY	
$\Delta \vdash \Gamma = \Gamma_1 \circ \Gamma_2 \quad \Delta \vdash \tau : \text{Copy}$	
$\Delta \vdash x : \tau, \Gamma = (x : \tau, \Gamma_1) \circ (x : \tau, \Gamma_2)$	
SPLITFUNCTION	
$\Delta \vdash \Gamma = \Gamma_1 \circ \Gamma_2$	
$\Delta \vdash f : (\mu_1, \dots, \mu_n) \rightarrow \tau, \Gamma =$ $(f : (\mu_1, \dots, \mu_n) \rightarrow \tau, \Gamma_1) \circ$ $(f : (\mu_1, \dots, \mu_n) \rightarrow \tau, \Gamma_2)$	

We can now proceed to the main typing judgments. TYPVARLINEAR and TYPVARDUP reflect the variable typing present in the context. TYPUPLECONS only allows non-reference values inside a tuple, with a linear context splitting to check each term of the tuple. TYPARRAYACCESS, TYPSEQACCESS and TYPSEQREFACCESS specify the array indexing syntax, which is overloaded to work with both `array!`, `Seq` and `&Seq`. This corresponds to the implementing of the Index trait in Rust.

The function call rule, TYPFUNCCALL, is the most complex rule of the typing judgment, because it contains the restricted borrowing form allowed in `hacspect`. First, note that the context is split for typechecking the arguments of the function, because a linear value cannot be used in two arguments. Next, TYPFUNARG ensures that the arguments are well-typed. However, if an argument is borrowed at call-site, then TYPFUNARGBORROW and TYPFUNARGBORROWVAR checks the value that is being borrowed under the reference. In our degenerate pattern of borrowing, TYPFUNARGBORROW and TYPFUNARGBORROWVAR are doing the work of the Rust borrow checker. The last rules for binary and unary operations are standard.

Value typing	$\Gamma; \Delta \vdash v : \mu$
Expression typing	$\Gamma; \Delta \vdash e : \tau \Rightarrow \Gamma'$
Function argument typing	$\Gamma; \Delta \vdash a \sim \tau \Rightarrow \Gamma'$
TYPUNIT	TYPBOOL
$\Gamma; \Delta \vdash () : \text{unit}$	$b \in \{\text{true}, \text{false}\}$
	$\Gamma; \Delta \vdash b : \text{bool}$
TYPINT	TYPSEQVALUE
$n \in \mathbb{N}$	$\forall i \in [1, n], \Gamma; \Delta \vdash v_i : \mu$
$\Gamma; \Delta \vdash n : \text{int}$	$\Gamma; \Delta \vdash [v_1, \dots, v_n] : \text{Seq} < \mu >$

TYPARRAYVALUE	TYPVALUEASEXPR
$\forall i \in [1, n], \Gamma; \Delta \vdash v_i : \mu$	$\Gamma; \Delta \vdash v : \mu$
$\Gamma; \Delta \vdash [v_1, \dots, v_n] : [\mu; n]$	$\Gamma; \Delta \vdash v : \mu \Rightarrow \Gamma$
TYPVARLINEAR	
$x : \tau, \Gamma; \Delta \vdash x : \tau \Rightarrow \Gamma$	
TYPVARDUP	
$x : \&\tau \in \Gamma$	
$\Gamma; \Delta \vdash x : \&\tau \Rightarrow \Gamma$	
TYPUPLEELIM	
$\Gamma; \Delta \vdash e : (\mu_1, \dots, \mu_m) \Rightarrow \Gamma' \quad n \in [1, m]$	
$\Gamma; \Delta \vdash e.n : \mu_n \Rightarrow \Gamma'$	
TYPUPLEREFELIM	
$\Gamma; \Delta \vdash e : \&(\mu_1, \dots, \mu_m) \Rightarrow \Gamma' \quad n \in [1, m]$	
$\Gamma; \Delta \vdash e.n : \&\mu_n \Rightarrow \Gamma'$	
TYPUPLEINTRO	
$\Delta \vdash \Gamma = \Gamma_1 \circ \dots \circ \Gamma_n$ $\forall i \in [1, n], \Gamma_i; \Delta \vdash e_i : \mu_i \Rightarrow \Gamma'_i$ $\Delta \vdash \Gamma' = \Gamma'_1 \circ \dots \circ \Gamma'_n$	
$\Gamma; \Delta \vdash (e_1, \dots, e_n) : (\mu_1, \dots, \mu_n) \Rightarrow \Gamma'$	
TYPARRAYACCESS	
$t \rightarrow [\mu; n] \in \Delta$ $\Delta \vdash \Gamma = \Gamma_1 \circ \Gamma_2 \quad \Gamma_1; \Delta \vdash x : t \Rightarrow \Gamma'_1$ $\Gamma_2; \Delta \vdash e : \text{int} \Rightarrow \Gamma'_2 \quad \Delta \vdash \Gamma' = \Gamma'_1 \circ \Gamma'_2$	
$\Gamma; \Delta \vdash x[e] : \mu \Rightarrow \Gamma'$	
TYPSEQACCESS	
$\Delta \vdash \Gamma = \Gamma_1 \circ \Gamma_2 \quad \Gamma_1; \Delta \vdash x : \text{Seq} < \mu > \Rightarrow \Gamma'_1$ $\Gamma_2; \Delta \vdash e : \text{int} \Rightarrow \Gamma'_2 \quad \Delta \vdash \Gamma' = \Gamma'_1 \circ \Gamma'_2$	
$\Gamma; \Delta \vdash x[e] : \mu \Rightarrow \Gamma'$	
TYPSEQREFACCESS	
$\Delta \vdash \Gamma = \Gamma_1 \circ \Gamma_2 \quad \Gamma_1; \Delta \vdash x : \&\text{Seq} < \mu > \Rightarrow \Gamma'_1$ $\Gamma_2; \Delta \vdash e : \text{int} \Rightarrow \Gamma'_2 \quad \Delta \vdash \Gamma' = \Gamma'_1 \circ \Gamma'_2$	
$\Gamma; \Delta \vdash x[e] : \mu \Rightarrow \Gamma'$	
TYPFUNCCALL	
$f : (\mu_1, \dots, \mu_n) \rightarrow \tau \in \Gamma$ $\Delta \vdash \Gamma = \Gamma_1 \circ \dots \circ \Gamma_n$ $\forall i \in [1, n], \Gamma_i; \Delta \vdash a_i \sim \mu_i \Rightarrow \Gamma'_i$ $\Delta \vdash \Gamma' = \Gamma'_1 \circ \dots \circ \Gamma'_n$	
$\Gamma; \Delta \vdash f(a_1, \dots, a_n) : \tau \Rightarrow \Gamma'$	
TYPFUNARG	TYPFUNARGBORROW
$\Gamma; \Delta \vdash e : \tau \Rightarrow \Gamma'$	$\Gamma; \Delta \vdash e : \mu \Rightarrow \Gamma'$
$\Gamma; \Delta \vdash e \sim \tau \Rightarrow \Gamma'$	$\Gamma; \Delta \vdash \&e \sim \&\mu \Rightarrow \Gamma'$
TYPFUNARGBORROWVAR	
$\Gamma; \Delta \vdash x : \mu \Rightarrow _$	
$\Gamma; \Delta \vdash \&x \sim \&\mu \Rightarrow \Gamma$	
TYPBINOPINT	
$\Delta \vdash \Gamma = \Gamma_1 \circ \Gamma_2$ $\Gamma_1; \Delta \vdash e_1 : \text{int} \Rightarrow \Gamma'_1 \quad \Gamma_2; \Delta \vdash e_2 : \text{int} \Rightarrow \Gamma'_2$ $\odot \in \{+, -, *, /\}$ $\Delta \vdash \Gamma' = \Gamma'_1 \circ \Gamma'_2$	
$\Gamma; \Delta \vdash e_1 \odot e_2 : \text{int} \Rightarrow \Gamma'$	

TYPBINOPBOOL

$$\frac{\begin{array}{c} \Delta \vdash \Gamma = \Gamma_1 \circ \Gamma_2 \\ \Gamma_1; \Delta \vdash e_1 : \text{bool} \Rightarrow \Gamma'_1 \quad \Gamma_2; \Delta \vdash e_2 : \text{bool} \Rightarrow \Gamma'_2 \\ \odot \in \{ \&\&, || \} \quad \Delta \vdash \Gamma' = \Gamma'_1 \circ \Gamma'_2 \end{array}}{\Gamma; \Delta \vdash e_1 \odot e_2 : \text{bool} \Rightarrow \Gamma'}$$

TYPBINOPCOMP

$$\frac{\begin{array}{c} \Delta \vdash \Gamma = \Gamma_1 \circ \Gamma_2 \\ \Gamma_1; \Delta \vdash e_1 : \text{int} \Rightarrow \Gamma'_1 \quad \Gamma_2; \Delta \vdash e_2 : \text{int} \Rightarrow \Gamma'_2 \\ \odot \in \{ ==, !=, >, < \} \quad \Delta \vdash \Gamma' = \Gamma'_1 \circ \Gamma'_2 \end{array}}{\Gamma; \Delta \vdash e_1 \odot e_2 : \text{bool} \Rightarrow \Gamma'}$$

TYPUNOPINT

$$\frac{\Gamma; \Delta \vdash e : \text{int} \Rightarrow \Gamma' \quad \odot \in \{ - \}}{\Gamma; \Delta \vdash \odot e : \text{int} \Rightarrow \Gamma'}$$

TYPUNOPBOOL

$$\frac{\Gamma; \Delta \vdash e : \text{bool} \Rightarrow \Gamma' \quad \odot \in \{ \sim \}}{\Gamma; \Delta \vdash \odot e : \text{bool} \Rightarrow \Gamma'}$$

Let's now move to the statement typing. We've chosen statements here rather than nested expressions because of the Rust behavior of the `if` statement and the `for` loop. A list of statement corresponds to a block, introduced in Rust by `{ ... }`. The single statement typing judgment produces a new Γ' because of variable definitions inside a block. Single statements also yield back a type, because the last statement of the function is also the return value of the function. All statement type except the last one should be `unit`.

The rule `TYPLET` introduces a new mutable local variable, that can later be reassigned (`TYPREASSIGN`) in the program. In Rust, the `mut` indicates that the local variable is mutable, in its absence, variable reassignments are prohibited. In this formalization, all variables are mutable for simplification. The main use of mutable local variables is for variables that are mutated inside a `for` loop. Indeed, because `for` loops are restricted to integer range iteration, we cannot express what would normally be a fold without these mutable variables. Because the mutable variables are local to a block, we do not need to formalize a full-fledged heap for the operational semantics. Rather, we will model them as a limited piece of state that gets passed around during execution.

Next, `TYPARRAYASSIGN` and `TYPSEQASSIGN` define the overloading of the array update syntax that works for both `array!` and `Seq`. Note that `TYPIFTHENELSE` use the same context Γ for the two branches of the conditional.

$$\frac{\begin{array}{c} \text{Statement typing} \quad \Gamma; \Delta \vdash s : \tau \Rightarrow \Gamma' \\ \text{Block typing} \quad \Gamma; \Delta \vdash b : \tau \Rightarrow \Gamma' \end{array}}{\Gamma; \Delta \vdash s : \tau \Rightarrow \Gamma'}$$

TYPLET

$$\frac{x \notin \Gamma \quad \Gamma; \Delta \vdash e : \tau \Rightarrow \Gamma'}{\Gamma; \Delta \vdash \text{let } x : \tau = e : \text{unit} \Rightarrow \Gamma', x : \tau}$$

TYPREASSIGN

$$\frac{x : \tau \in \Gamma \quad \Gamma; \Delta \vdash e : \tau \Rightarrow \Gamma'}{\Gamma; \Delta \vdash x = e : \text{unit} \Rightarrow \Gamma', x : \tau}$$

TYPARRAYASSIGN

$$\frac{\begin{array}{c} x : t \in \Gamma \quad t \rightarrow [\mu; n] \in \Delta \\ \Delta \vdash \Gamma = \Gamma_1 \circ \Gamma_2 \quad \Gamma_1; \Delta \vdash e_1 : \text{int} \Rightarrow \Gamma'_1 \\ \Gamma_2; \Delta \vdash e_2 : \mu \Rightarrow \Gamma'_2 \quad \Delta \vdash \Gamma' = \Gamma'_1 \circ \Gamma'_2 \end{array}}{\Gamma; \Delta \vdash x [e_1] = e_2 : \text{unit} \Rightarrow x : t, \Gamma'}$$

TYPSEQASSIGN

$$\frac{\begin{array}{c} x : \text{Seq} < \mu > \in \Gamma \\ \Delta \vdash \Gamma = \Gamma_1 \circ \Gamma_2 \quad \Gamma; \Delta \vdash e_1 : \text{int} \Rightarrow \Gamma'_1 \\ \Gamma; \Delta \vdash e_2 : \mu \Rightarrow \Gamma'_2 \quad \Delta \vdash \Gamma' = \Gamma'_1 \circ \Gamma'_2 \end{array}}{\Gamma; \Delta \vdash x [e_1] = e_2 : \text{unit} \Rightarrow x : \text{Seq} < \mu >, \Gamma'}$$

TYPIFTHEN

$$\frac{\Gamma; \Delta \vdash e : \text{bool} \Rightarrow \Gamma' \quad \Gamma'; \Delta \vdash b : \text{unit} \Rightarrow \Gamma''}{\Gamma; \Delta \vdash \text{if } e \text{ then } b : \text{unit} \Rightarrow \Gamma''}$$

TYPIFTHENELSE

$$\frac{\begin{array}{c} \Gamma; \Delta \vdash e : \text{bool} \Rightarrow \Gamma_c \quad \Gamma_c; \Delta \vdash b : \text{unit} \Rightarrow \Gamma_t \\ \Gamma_c; \Delta \vdash b' : \text{unit} \Rightarrow \Gamma_f \quad \Gamma' = \Gamma \cap \Gamma_f \cap \Gamma_t \end{array}}{\Gamma; \Delta \vdash \text{if } e \text{ then } b \text{ else } b' : \text{unit} \Rightarrow \Gamma'}$$

TYPFORLOOP

$$\frac{\begin{array}{c} \Gamma; \Delta \vdash e_1 : \text{int} \Rightarrow \Gamma_1 \quad \Gamma_1; \Delta \vdash e_2 : \text{int} \Rightarrow \Gamma_2 \\ \Gamma_2, x : \text{int}; \Delta \vdash b : \text{unit} \Rightarrow \Gamma_b \\ \Gamma_2 \subset \Gamma_b \quad \Gamma' = \Gamma \cap \Gamma_b \end{array}}{\Gamma; \Delta \vdash \text{for } x \text{ in } e_1 \dots e_2 \text{ b : unit} \Rightarrow \Gamma'}$$

TYPBLOCK

$$\frac{\begin{array}{c} \Gamma; \Delta \vdash s_1 : \text{unit} \Rightarrow \Gamma' \\ \Gamma'; \Delta \vdash \{ s_2; \dots; s_n \} : \tau \\ \Gamma; \Delta \vdash \{ s_1; \dots; s_n \} : \tau \end{array}}{\Gamma; \Delta \vdash \{ s_1; \dots; s_n \} : \tau}$$

TYPBLOCKONE

$$\frac{\Gamma; \Delta \vdash s_1 : \tau \Rightarrow \Gamma'}{\Gamma; \Delta \vdash \{ s_1 \} : \tau}$$

TYPBLOCKASSTATEMENT

$$\frac{\Gamma; \Delta \vdash b : \tau}{\Gamma; \Delta \vdash b : \tau \Rightarrow \Gamma}$$

TYPEXPSTOstmt

$$\frac{\Gamma; \Delta \vdash e : \tau}{\Gamma; \Delta \vdash e : \tau \Rightarrow \Gamma}$$

A `hacspect` program is a list of items i . Their typing judgment produces both a new Γ and Δ , because an item introduces either a new function or a new named type. Please note, as mentioned before, that the return type of functions is restricted to μ , as returning a reference is forbidden. The `TYPFNDECL` also means that recursion is forbidden in `hacspect`, since f is not passed in its typing context.

$$\frac{}{\text{Item typing} \quad \Gamma; \Delta \vdash i \Rightarrow \Gamma'; \Delta'}$$

TYPARRAYDECL

$$\frac{}{\Gamma; \Delta \vdash \text{array}! (t, \mu, n) \Rightarrow \Gamma; \Delta, t \rightarrow [\mu; n]}$$

TYPFNDECL

$$\frac{\Gamma, x_1 : \tau_1, \dots, x_n : \tau_n; \Delta \vdash b : \mu}{\Gamma; \Delta \vdash \text{fn } f (x_1 : \tau_1, \dots, x_n : \tau_n) \rightarrow \mu \Rightarrow \Gamma, f : (\tau_1, \dots, \tau_n) \rightarrow \mu; \Delta}$$